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INTRODUCTION
Modern employment trends threaten to jeopardize what little
privacy protections American workers have.1 Trends like private
amenities on corporate campuses, using a single device for both work
and personal purposes, social media usage, and the “24/7 workplace”
provide more potential than ever before for privacy invasions while
simultaneously denying employees the opportunity to obtain
meaningful remedies for those invasions.
The crux of the failure to adequately protect employee privacy lies
in the structure of the legal standard itself. Traditional privacy laws are
deeply rooted in a flawed conceptual underpinning–the notion that
legally protectable privacy in the employment relationship exists in a
neatly discernable “private sphere.”2 This concept undermines the
effectiveness of the legal tests3 to expand or even maintain privacy
protections in employment.4
First, this comment will identify the problem that modern
employment trends collapse distinctions between private and work

1. See Ronald P. Angerer II, Moving Beyond A Brick and Mortar Understanding of
State Action: The Case for A More Majestic State Action Doctrine to Protect Employee
Privacy in the Workplace, 4 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (describing the current state of
American employment law as “woefully inadequate in promoting and protecting employee
privacy at the workplace.”).
2. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
555 (2006).
3. A subjective-objective determination of the “reasonableness” of an employee’s
privacy expectation operates as a threshold consideration to establishing privacy right in the
employment relationship. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century
Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 291 (2011) (advocating for a
recognition of actual employment monitoring policies because “[s]uch recognition must lead
to a rebalancing of current legal provisions to reflect the realities of the twenty-first-century
workplace.”).

2017]

#PRIVATESPHERE

289

spheres rendering the legal standards to determine privacy invasions at
work futile.
Second, this comment will explore the modern
technologies and work structures that complicate the effective
application of traditional privacy tests. Third, this comment will trace
the historical development of privacy law and discuss the overarching
concept of private spheres. Finally, this comment proposes an interim
solution borrowing well-established international privacy principles5 to
promote transparency and choice in data use and collection. The
ultimate goal of the proposal is to empower workers as full participants
in the economic, social and political processes necessary to overhaul
the broken legal tools, which fail to protect employee privacy.
I. THE LEGAL PROBLEM — COLLAPSED DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND WORK SPHERES RENDER LEGAL
DOCTRINES OF PRIVACY LAW FUTILE IN THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP
The legal standard to determine an invasion of privacy is
insufficient to fully capture the complexities of the modern
employment relationship.6 The current standard exacerbates the
existing power imbalance between employer and employee because “it
gives the employer the power to determine its liability simply by
modifying the work environment to decrease employee privacy
expectations.”7 Nevertheless, it is not enough to redraft the current
legal tests because the central concepts in privacy doctrine are rooted in
a distorted legal fiction of a distinct “private sphere” that is unrealistic
to provide protection in the modern workplace where clear distinctions
between work and private lives have collapsed.8
Under the existing regime, employee privacy rights have
significantly diminished9 and current workplace organization trends are
5. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderfl
owsofpersonaldata.htm#guidelines.
6. Angerer, supra note 1, at 3-4 (advocating for increased state action to protect
employee privacy “[m]oreover, employment law has, unfortunately, proven to be woefully
inadequate in promoting and protecting employee privacy at the workplace.”).
7. Larry O. Natt Gantt II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring
in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 424 (1995).
8. Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional
Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 229 (2011) (advocating for a paradoxical shift in
perceptions to meet the spatial complexities of the “virtual socialscape exists at right angles
to the physical world, and so our perceptions must bend accordingly.”).
9. Angerer, supra note 1, at 5 (elaborating that “scholars have described current
employee privacy under the law as: ‘near extinction,’ usually lacking a remedy for
employees, and approaching the point where, ‘employers can become Big Brother’”).
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likely to provide employees with a false sense of security about their
privacy rights.10 The increased capabilities of new monitoring
technologies, coupled with the risk of employee misconception of their
legal rights, threaten to unnecessarily complicate workplace dynamics
and undermine the limited privacy protections available to
employees.11
Two critical issues remain unsettled in employment privacy law
and threaten to give rise to a wave of unnecessary litigation if
technological trends and work structures continue current trajectories.
First, modern technologies complicate the application of privacy law in
the employment relationship because monitoring technologies can
collect more data than ever before, thus unnecessarily increasing the
risk of invading an employee’s “private sphere.” Second, both
employer and employee expectations of their working relationship are
not in harmony with actual legal rights to privacy.
II. ANALYSIS
Meaningful privacy protections for workers are often thwarted by
the very legal standards established to create privacy rights.12
Employers effectively control the scope of an employee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy by manipulating practices and procedures in the
workplace. This uneven balance of power and information in favor of
the employer, has potentially harmful repercussions such as “the
impact of excessive and undisclosed monitoring in employee
morale.”13
Finally, the reasonable expectation of privacy standard as applied,
does not mesh with actual practice and employee perceptions.
Businesses are global and mobile, requiring a flexible workforce
willing to give up ever-increasing amounts of their personal time to
contribute their labor.14 Twenty-first century workers rarely enjoy the
seclusion of a true private sphere and converge their work and private

10. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 290–91 (arguing that “it is important that the law
recognize the power of contemporary monitoring technology, the ever-increasing number of
hours contemporary Americans spend at work, and the impact of excessive and undisclosed
monitoring on employee morale. Such recognition must lead to a rebalancing of current
legal provisions to reflect the realities of the twenty-first-century workplace”).
11. Id. at 357-58 (explaining that “[i]t is an easy case to make that the current legal
regime is inadequate to protect an employee’s every move from the scrutiny of today’s
monitoring practices”).
12. Angerer, supra note 1, at 4 (reiterating that “[m]oreover, employment law has,
unfortunately, proven to be woefully inadequate in promoting and protecting employee
privacy at the workplace”).
13. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 290–91.
14. Gantt, supra note 7, at 424.
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lives into their daily routines. These trends towards comingled work
structures and technological advancements in monitoring threaten to
erode employee privacy rights because any employee’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is subject to modification by the employer.
A. Modern Technologies Complicate Effective Application of the
Traditional Privacy Tests
Modern monitoring technologies collect more data than ever
before and present an unprecedented risk of invading employee
privacy. These advances in the capacity of monitoring technologies
and their pervasive use to monitor employees present an unprecedented
risk of invading employee privacy.15 These new and emerging
technologies are problematic in the employment context because they
facilitate privacy invasions into “the personal lives of employees with
little or no chance of detection,” and “[allow] employers to
manipulate, access, and collect information about employees in greater
amounts than previously possible.”16
Many savvy employers leverage the work related technology they
provide to their employees as a tool to closely monitor employees.17
These electronic monitoring efforts may inspect employee
communications and movements, including phone calls, e-mails,
internet usage and Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled devices.
Even when employers have legitimate business reasons to justify
monitoring,18 the risk of collecting incredibly sensitive personal
information of workers that are in turn subject to various overlapping
privacy regimes and government agencies may curb the savvy
employer’s appetite for widespread use of these disruptive
technologies.
Unfortunately these technological advancements “outpace existing
15. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 357–58(explaining that “[i]t is an easy case to make that
the current legal regime is inadequate to protect an employee’s every move from the
scrutiny of today’s monitoring practices”).
16. Gantt, supra note 7, at 346.
17. See Melinda L. McLellan et al., Wherever You Go, There You Are (with Your
Mobile Device): Privacy Risks and Legal Complexities Associated with International “Bring
Your Own Device” Programs, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30 (2015). Consistent with the
fractured privacy regulatory regimes in the United States, new technologies and BYOD
policies are subject to multiple potentially overlapping federal statutes including: Electronic
Communications Privacy Act; the Stored Communications Act; and the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act.
18. Greg Mgrditchian, Employment & Social Media Privacy: Employer Justifications
for Access to “Private” Material, 41 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 108, 133 (2015)
(elaborating that legitimate business concerns may include: “concern[] with the public
image of their business, the economic viability of the company, the protection and safety of
other employees and customers, [and] avoiding lawsuits”).
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legal sources of privacy protection, as courts seem unwilling or unable
to protect employees from purely electronic invasions of privacy.”19
1. BYOD/Single Device Issues
The common practice of an employee using a single internet
capable device to complete both personal and professional tasks20
exemplifies the ways in which a delineable zone of work is inadequate
to address the realities of modern employment trends.
“Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) policies have evolved as the
“go-to standard in most workplaces.”21 Corporate BYOD policies
encourage a work culture where employees are available to perform
work related tasks at any hour.22 The practice of comingling personal
and work related data on the same device may be mitigated somewhat
through geofencing software,23 but ultimately BYOD highlights just
how entangled the private and work realms have become.24
BYOD policies demonstrate the interests at odds in employment
privacy and technological advancements—the employee interest in
personal data privacy is pitted directly against the employer cyber
security and trade secret concerns.25 The technology also presents a
complicated conceptual challenge to existing employment privacy laws
and practical challenges with attempts to “disentangle the personal
from the professional when it comes to protecting and monitoring data
on their employees’ devices—and this premise assumes it is even
possible to make a meaningful distinction between the two.”26
2. GPS Technology
Another technological advancement with serious employment
19. Gantt, supra note 7, at 346.
20. McLellan et al., supra note 17, at 1.
21. Freeland Cooper, Foreman LLP, BYOD? Avoiding the Pitfalls of Employee Use of
Personal Devices, 22 No. 13 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 10 (Oct. 8, 2012).
22. See McLellan et al., supra note 17, at 3 (explaining that “BYOD is touted as
‘combining workforce mobility and ‘always reachable’ boosts in employee productivity
with possible savings on corporate telecom services and device spending.’”).
23. Roman Foeckl, Why Geofencing Will Become the Next Endpoint Security
Innovation, SC MAGAZINE UK (May 6, 2015),
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/why-geofencing-will-become-the-next-endpoint-securityinnovation/article/413037/.
“Geofencing can restrict access to devices or

applications while inside a company's perimeter, making it impossible for
devices outside the perimeter to access the network.”
24. See McLellan et al., supra note 17, at 3–4 (reiterating the purported benefits of
BYOD “as a boon to employees [who] want to use their own smartphones and tablets at
work for convenience as the border between work and personal or recreational activities
continues to blur”).
25. Id. at 4–6.
26. Id. at 4.
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privacy implications is the rise in devices that include Global
Positioning System (GPS) technology. GPS is a satellite-based
navigation system in which a “receiver can accurately determine its
position within a few meters.”27 GPS devices in company issued cell
phones and vehicles “allow . . . employers to keep tabs on employee
hours or vehicle travel.”28 The potential privacy invasions at risk with
GPS technology are even more problematic than standard surveillance
because of “the extraordinary capacity of a GPS device to permit
‘[c]onstant, relentless tracking of anything.’”29
Some state courts have begun to address the privacy implications
of GPS tracking technology in the workplace. For example, in
Cunningham v. New York State Dep’t of Labor the court ordered
suppression of GPS evidence because the public employer failed to
“mak[e] a reasonable effort to avoid tracking an employee outside of
business hours.”30 The court created a categorical GPS exception to a
general rule that permits employers to use “permissible portion[s] of
the search” even when the search as a whole exceeds its permissible
scope.31 The court reasoned that the very nature of GPS technology to
monitor intimate details makes the previous rule that favored
employers simply “inapplicable to GPS searches.”32
Additionally, in Haggins v. Verizon New England, Inc. union
employees were allowed to challenge their employer’s use of GPS
tracking software as both an unfair labor practice and an invasion of
privacy.33 In Haggins, the court did not decide the privacy issue on its
merits, but proceeded to outline the difficult test an employee seeking
privacy protections must meet.34 The Massachusetts test required
employees to show “not only that the [employer] unreasonably,
substantially and seriously interfered with [their] privacy by disclosing
facts of highly personal or intimate nature, but also that it had no

27. Adam Koppel, Warranting A Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by
Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1061, 1063–64 (2010).
28. Id. at 1064.
29. Cunningham v. New York State Dep’t of Labor, 21 N.Y.3d 515, 523 (2013)
(quoting People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441 (2009)).
30. Id.
31. Id. (noting that the “extraordinary capacity” of the technology makes it
categorically unfit for the general rule).
32. Id.
33. Haggins v. Verizon New England, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328-30 (D. Mass.
2010) aff’d, 648 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2011).
34. Haggins v. Verizon New England, Inc., 648 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding
that the Labor Management Relations Act preempted the employee’s privacy claim and that
resolution of their claim required interpretation of their collective bargaining agreement).
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legitimate reason for doing so.”35 This reiteration of the reasonableness
requirement is particularly challenging for non-union employees,
because without independent contractual protections the default
contours of reasonableness rely on merely on industry standards.36
3. The Internet of Things
The number of devices connected to the internet has increased
exponentially,37 and the proliferation of these devices as tools to
increase work productivity create heightened privacy risks in the
modern employment relationship.
The term Internet of Things (“IoT”) broadly encompasses the
“network of physical objects embedded with electronics, software,
sensors and connectivity” which in turn “enable [those objects] to
achieve greater value and service by exchanging data with . . . [an]
operator.”38 For example, modern objects like fitness trackers, cell
phones, refrigerators, thermostats, Amazon’s “dash button,”39 cars, and
even children’s toys40 are part of the growing Internet of Things
because they connect to the internet and exchange data to perform
specific functions.41
In 2015, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) estimated the

35. Id. (quoting Martinez v. New Eng. Med. Ctr. Hosps., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 257, 267
(D. Mass. 2004).
36. Id. at 55–56 (noting that a key factor “to determine the reasonableness of the
interference likely will require resort to the custom and usage of the parties and their
particular industry practices”).
37. See Federal Trade Commission Remarks, How to Regulate the Internet of Things
Without Harming Its Future, 2015 WL 3541727, at 3 (May 21, 2015) (showing the trend
that “[r]esearchers have estimated 900 million devices were connected to the Internet in
2009, increasing to 8.7 billion devices in 2012, and now up to 14 billion devices today” and
predicting the trend growing “that by 2020 there will be 25 to more than 30 billion devices
connected to the Internet of Things”).
38. Id.
at
1
(quoting
Internet
of
Things,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_of_Things).
39. Amazon’s “Dash Button” is a plastic button that allows “shoppers to reorder
frequently used domestic products like laundry detergent or paper towels with the click of a
real-life button.” Ian Crouch, The Horror of Amazon’s New Dash Button, THE NEW
YORKER (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-horror-ofamazons-new-dash-button.
40. Mattel’s “Hello Barbie” is a doll connected to the internet featuring speech
recognition and progressive learning features which allow a user to engage in “real-time
artificially intelligent conversations” with a doll that is constantly transmitting the
information it receives from the user to have more personalized “conversations.” Hello
Barbie
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://hellobarbiefaq.mattel.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/hellobarbie-faq-v3.pdf.
41. See Andy Greenberg and Kim Zetter, How the Internet of Things Got Hacked,
WIRED MAGAZINE (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/2015-the-year-theinternet-of-things-got-hacked/.
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number of internet connected devices to be 14 billion,42 put another
way “[t]here are currently more devices connected to the internet than
people on the planet.”43 As these devices become more prolific
throughout the global economy, they have also found their way into the
employment relationship through telepresence and wearable
technology.44
If market trends continue, some hypothesize
fundamental “change[s] [in] the organization of work and our
workspaces” where workers rely on “algorithms embodied as robots or
avatars [to] provide solutions to problems [and] facilitate decisionmaking.”45
These devices have the ability to track incredibly intimate details
about an employee46 and yet their development, use, and proliferation
continue without regulatory protections. In January 2015, the FTC
suggested that because the industry is still in its infancy, specific
legislation targeting the industry would be unduly burdensome to
developers and ineffective to protect consumers.47
The unprecedented ability of devices in the Internet of Things to
both monitor and interact with private details about employees
combined with the lack of federal regulation in the area presents
significant risk of invasion of employee privacy.
4. Social Media Usage in Workplace
Finally, the pervasiveness of social media presents additional
technological complications to workplace privacy where the “legal
implications of this movement are still evolving daily.”48 Social

42. Federal Trade Commission Remarks, How to Regulate the Internet of Things
Without Harming Its Future, 2015 WL 3541727, at 3 (May 21, 2015).
43. Id.
44. Jason Corsello, What the Internet of Things Will Bring to the Workplace, WIRED
MAGAZINE, http://www.wired.com/insights/2013/11/what-the-internet-of-things-will-bringto-the-workplace/.
45. Id.
46. See Federal Trade Commission, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security In a
Connected World (Jan. 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-reportnovember-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf
(explaining that “one researcher has hypothesized that although a consumer may today use a
fitness tracker solely for wellness-related purposes, the data gathered by the device could be
used in the future to price health or life insurance or to infer the user’s suitability for credit
or employment”).
47. See generally Federal Trade Commission, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security In
a Connected World (Jan. 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-reportnovember-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
48. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 109.
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media49 sites like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and LinkedIn “gained
prominence rapidly” and have drastically changed the tone and impact
of life in the Information Age.50 As of September 2016, Facebook had
over 1.79 billion active users, and of those active users an average of
1.09 billion people used a mobile device to access the site each day.51
The massive popularity of online sharing combined with the
estimate that “employees spend about [an average of] one to two hours
a day using the Internet for personal use” exposes a potentially vast
workplace privacy issue as “it is not hard to imagine that in today’s
society, where technology and communication join at the proverbial
hip, social media use during work hours is a widespread issue.”52
Employer and young professional interests in social media could
converge as the ability to use social media during work becomes an
exchange for payment.53 Surprisingly, Millennial workers place such a
high value on “social media flexibility” that one poll revealed that 45%
of participants would accept a position with lower wages in exchange
for a “more liberal policy toward personal tech devices and access to
social media at work.”54 Social media has developed into a widespread
form of instantaneous communication,55 and the complicated
interwoven personal and professional functions they serve also
undermine the legal myth of a purely private sphere.
An employer may inadvertently capture social media data on its
employees when an employee accesses the site on a company network,
or an employer may intentionally capture this data as part of its routine
employee monitoring policy. Employers justify monitoring the social
media activity of employees as necessary to address legitimate business
49. Cal. Lab. Code § 980 (defining social media as “an electronic service or account, or
electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs, video
blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or accounts, or Internet
Web site profiles or locations”).
50. Strutin, supra note 8. at 287–89 (concluding that the movement towards social
media is a “new part of the Information Age, the Social Media Era. It is the time of quantum
computing and the specter of nearly a billion personal profiles online”).
51. Facebook Newsroom, Statistics (2016), http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/.
52. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 116 (describing the pervasiveness of internet use–
“[s]tudies show that, on average, employees spend about one to two hours a day using the
internet for personal use”).
53. Strutin, supra note 8, at 288.
54. Mark I. Schickman, Dude How Fast Is Your Connection?, 21 NO. 20 CAL. EMP. L.
LETTER 3 (Jan. 23, 2012). “CISCO [] polled 2,800 college students and young professionals,
[and] it found that social media flexibility was a significant factor in job choice: 40 percent
of the college students and 45 percent of the employed 20-somethings said they would take
a lower-paying job with a more liberal policy toward personal tech devices and access to
social media at work.”
55. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 116 (explaining that “[t]he world’s two most popular
social media sites, Facebook and Twitter, have approximately 1.11 billion and 232 million
active users, respectively.”).
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concerns such as productivity, safety, and reputation.56 However,
employers who engage in extensive social media monitoring should
beware the risks of obtaining too much information.
For example, in 2010 the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) began policing employers who terminated employees
because of their social media activity.57 The NLRB investigated and
prosecuted employers with written social media policies that had the
potential to violate the National Labor Relations Act, because the
policies “interfered with the rights of employees . . . to discuss wages
and working conditions with co-workers.”58 Due to the influx and
uncertainty in the law, employers may now refrain from establishing
written social media policies to avoid potential liability from the
NLRB.59
B. Workers May Lack Understanding of the Implications of Privacy at
Work
The daily reality of employee interactions with their employer,
coworkers, schedules and environment fosters misconceptions about
the true privacy risks employees face during work and the effectiveness
of any legal remedy. The business trends to incorporate personal
amenities into the workspace and encourage on-call but “flexible”
work schedules may signal to employees that they have some
autonomous control over their personal privacy while at work.
1. Corporate Campus Operates as a Company Town
First, the environment of a modern corporate campus intentionally
bleeds the lines between traditional “private sphere” and “work”
activities much like the Industrial Era company town.60 At first glance
this blended work and private environment may appear altruistic, but
56. Id. at 133 (noting that an employer’s legitimate business concerns include:
“concern with the public image of their business, the economic viability of the company, the
protection and safety of other employees and customers, avoiding lawsuits, and many other
things that can affect an endless amount of people”).
57. The NLRB and Social Media, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NEWS &
OUTREACH: FACT SHEETS, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/nlrb-and-socialmedia (explaining that “[i]n four cases involving employees’ use of Facebook, the Office of
General Counsel found that the employees were engaged in “protected concerted activity”
because they were discussing terms and conditions of employment with fellow
employees.”).
58. Id.
59. Scott A. Faust, Electronic Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, Practical Law
Practice Note, 1-506-8862 (advising employers to “use caution before taking any personnel
or legal action against an employee for Facebook or other social media posts in light of
recent decisions by the [National Labor Relations Board] NLRB.”).
60. See infra section IV A 2 ii (discussing work organization of company towns).
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its rise as the new social norm threatens to repeat history and block
employees from any reasonable expectation of privacy.
One-way employers entice modern workers to devote more time
and energy to company productivity is through benefits and
accommodations. These benefits encourage employees to rely on their
employer for tasks that were once reserved for private life after
working hours.
For example, some of the benefits Silicon Valley companies
provide include on site gyms, free or subsidized meals, dry cleaning
services, scheduling last minute babysitters for sick kids, or even house
cleaning services.61 The inclusion of these traditionally private
individual responsibilities into the fabric of work life has created a
corporate campus that resembles a modern day company town.
Because the corporate campus arguably serves as a blended space for
individuals to contribute productive labor and fulfill personal needs,
employees may unknowingly sacrifice their privacy protections
because they lack reasonable privacy expectations while using
employer services on employer property.
2. Flexible Work Schedules May Warp Expectations
Second, the flexible yet continuous schedules of modern work
may give employees a false illusion that autonomy to control the hours
in which they work also carries implicit rights to privacy. Employees
dedicate an ever-increasing number of hours to their work,62 and
simultaneously manage their personal and business responsibilities
from the same devices. Because the “new world order is a 24/7
workplace”63 where employees are expected to use the internet to work
anywhere and anytime,64 some may believe that the brief moment spent
answering a late night work email from home and then setting up a
confidential doctor’s appointment the next minute means that the latter
is protected from an employer’s prying eyes. This trend to more
flexible but overall longer workdays only “[intensifies the] need for

61. John C. Goodman, Silicon Valley Employers Go Wild With Lavish Employee
Benefits,
FORBES
(Oct.
30,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2012/10/30/silicon-valley-employers-go-wildwith-lavish-employee-benefits/.
62. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 290–91.
63. Michelle Lee Flores, Cozen O’Connor, 7 ‘Gotchas’ of the 24/7 Workplace, 25 No.
10 CAL. EMP. L. LETTER 4 (Aug. 24, 2015).
64. Claire Cain Miller, Silicon Valley Is Growing Up, Giving Parents a Break, THE
NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/upshot/siliconvalley-is-growing-up-giving-parents-a-break.html?_r=0 (explaining that “[l]ong hours in the
office and the expectations of being connected at home are familiar to workers across
industries, not just Silicon Valley.”).
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workplace privacy,” because employees spend less time than ever
before in the traditional sanctity of privacy and thereby relinquish more
privacy protections to their employer. 65
3. False Sense of Security of Interconnected Lives and Autonomy
Ultimately the flexibility of the blended work environment that
incorporates traditionally “private” duties into the corporate campus,
coupled with the flexible work schedule, may give employees a false
sense of security that their lives are interconnected only when they
choose for them to be. As any recognizable distinctions between
private and work spheres continue to collapse, the new social norm that
emerges has the potential to completely unravel the legal standards of
privacy in the employment relationship.
As mentioned above, workers may think they are bargaining for
the benefit of flexible technology and social media policies when they
are actually undermining their own reasonable expectations to
privacy.66 That bargain has unexpected consequences for employee
privacy; in reality “employees who use social media to post during
work hours, or discuss activities that took place during work hours,
enjoy the weakest protections under the law and have a severely
diminished expectation of privacy.”67
The trend towards a blended, amorphous work environment has
serious consequences for employers and employees. This structure
weakens traditional distinctions of determining the privacy protection
of a space based on its purpose and function. As societal roles for
spaces become amorphous, these societal shifts transform the threshold
legal consideration of privacy claims and further erodes the limited
protection available to workers.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Privacy Law in the Employment Relationship
Privacy protections in the United States are enforced through a
fragmented regulatory scheme where certain industries or categories
are often subject to overlapping or even conflicting regulations.68
Privacy in the employment relationship is no different.69 In the
65. Gantt, supra note 7, at 424.
66. See Schickman, supra note 56.
67. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 132.
68. Angerer, supra note 1, at 9.
69. Id at 7–9. (explaining that the “patchwork” of statutory attempts to provide workers
with more privacy protections allow for a wide degree of variance with only “nominal”
protection).
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employment context, rights to privacy may arise from various sources:
the United States Constitution, federal statutes, state law, common law,
and contract.70
Claims of workplace privacy invasions are highly factual inquiries
that “must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”71 The specific
factual situation at issue requires courts to evaluate each particular
situational context to determine the appropriate source of law to
apply.72
For instance, privacy invasions made by public employers are held
to a Constitutional standard, whereas private employers are not.73 So
while an invasion of privacy claim against a public employer is subject
to the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and
seizure by the government,74 the same claim against a private employer
may only be subject to state regulations.75 There is no universal legal
standard of what employer actions will constitute an invasion of
employee privacy, and due to the nature of the inquiry there is “no
talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that
society is prepared to accept as reasonable.”76
1. General Framework to Determine Employment Privacy
Despite the various sources of employment privacy law, judicial
interpretation of the invasion of employee privacy remains similar.
Generally courts will consider three factors to determine whether an
employee’s right to privacy has been violated: (1) whether the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy; (2) the extent of the
employer’s intrusion on that reasonable expectation; and (3) the
employer’s legitimate business reasons for the intrusion.77 Most courts
70. Id. at 7–9, n.67 (explaining that “[o]ther claims, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract, have
also been used to attempt to remedy invasions of privacy by employers.”).
71. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 317 (2010) (quoting O’Connor
v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987).
72. See Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 113–14; O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715
(1987) (explaining the role of establishing contours of the workplace, “[b]ecause the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search,
is understood to differ according to context, it is essential first to delineate the boundaries of
the workplace context.”).
73. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 113–14.
74. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725–26. The Ortega case is the most influential case of
unreasonable search and seizure by the government as an employer. In the opinion Justice
O’Connor established the Constitutional requirements of the ‘special needs doctrine,’
thereby permitting the government as an employer to invade employee privacy under a
tiered standard of reasonableness.
75. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
76. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715.
77. Id. at 725–26.While O’Connor v. Ortega addressed an unwarranted search by the
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tend to weigh an employer’s legitimate business interest more heavily
than the employee’s privacy interest.78 This bias in favor of employers
reflects the idea that activity in the workplace is subject to public gaze
and that the “workplace exists [only] for work purposes.”79
i. Common Law – Intrusion Upon Seclusion Tort
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is a vestige of the first
common law recognition of privacy80 and remains the “most commonly
[used tort] to protect employee privacy against excessive employer
intrusion.”81 Intrusion upon seclusion, or the “right to be let alone,”
was developed to “[protect] the individual from unwanted social
invasions.”82 The jurisprudence that developed the right to be let alone
describes privacy interests as “safe zone[s],” “private realm[s],” and a
“private sphere.”83
Intrusion upon seclusion “creates a cause of action when one
intrudes ‘upon the solitude84 or seclusion of another or h[er] private
affairs or concerns’ if the intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable
person.’”85 This protected right to solitude “enables people to rest from
the pressures of living in public and performing public roles.”86 Critics
of the tort argue that the element requiring the degree of the intrusion
to be “highly offensive” improperly places emphasis “not [on] privacy,
but outrage.”87
Courts generally adhere to the subtle, yet overpowering concept of
personal space and “recognize intrusion upon seclusion tort actions

government as employer, it serves as the touchstone framework for most employment
privacy tests. “In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the
invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need
for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.” Id. at 719–20.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Solove, supra note 2, at 483, 552–53 (explaining the historical significance of the
intrusion upon seclusion claim as “[o]ne of the torts inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s
article [‘The Right to Privacy’]”).
81. Angerer, supra note 1, at 9.
82. Solove, supra note 2, at 553.
83. Id. at 553–54. Despite the language supporting privacy interests as a definable
space or zone, Daniel Solove contends “intrusion [upon that zone] need not involve spatial
incursions.”
84. Id. at 554. “[S]olitude, [means] the state of being alone or able to retreat from the
presence of others.”
85. Id. at 553.
86. Id. at 555.
87. Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 221, 228 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he inescapable conclusion is that what the
law of intrusion actually regulates is not privacy, but outrage. The law protects freedom
from emotional distress, not freedom of informational control”).
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only when a person is at home or in a secluded place.”88 This approach
is essentially “akin to courts recognizing a harm in surveillance only
when conducted in private, not in public.”89
ii. California State Constitutional Approach
The California state constitution established an inalienable right to
privacy that employees may use to enforce privacy rights in the
workplace.90 The California reiteration of the three factor balancing
test focuses on the parties’ interests in light of “established social
norms.”91 To determine established social norms, the court inquires
into the given “customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding
[the potential violation of privacy].”92
Even though the “established social norms” requirement has the
potential to enhance worker privacy rights, in practice the language
operates similarly to the largely ineffective intrusion upon seclusion
tort.93 California courts have even gone so far as to use the social
norms consideration to eliminate employee recovery for computer
invasions, reasoning that the mere “use of computers in the
employment context carries with it social norms that effectively
diminish the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
to h[er] use of h[er] employer’s computers.”94
2. The Overarching Concept of a Distinct “Private Sphere” in the
Legal Standards
Each of the various legal approaches outlined above are connected
by the thematic concept of a protected space, a distinct “private sphere”
which is legally discernable and separate from work.95 The private
sphere is understood as a “zone or aura around us to separate ourselves
88. Solove, supra note 2, at 555.
89. Id. at 555–56.
90. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1. (establishing that “[a]ll people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy”); see also TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App.
4th 443, 450 (2002).
91. Cal. Const. art. I § 1.
92. Id.
93. TBG Ins. Servs. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 4th at 450. “The ‘community norms’ aspect of
the ‘reasonable expectation’ element of an invasion of privacy claim is this: “ ‘The
protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of
the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and
fellow citizens.’”
94. Id. at 452–54.
95. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987). The Court presumed that it is
possible to “delineate the boundaries of the workplace context” and suggested that the
boundaries be a threshold determination.

2017]

#PRIVATESPHERE

303

from others.”96 This theoretical “private sphere” is pervasive in
privacy law,97 and limits the scope of privacy protections in the
employment context where clear zones of “private” or “work” are often
difficult to delineate.
For example, the intrusion upon seclusion tort was created to
“protect a safe zone, a private realm free from intrusions.”98 The tort
establishes certain societal values as legal standards to “uphold[] rules
of civility and social respect” by respecting other’s “territories of the
self.”99 To prevail on an intrusion upon seclusion claim, the employer
must have “penetrated100 some zone of physical or sensory privacy [] in
violation of the law or social norms.”101 The thematic concept
consistent in each legal standard to determine privacy is the reliance on
the legal fiction of clear spatial distinctions.
i. The Historical Development of a Legally Protected
“Private Sphere”
The concept of a legally protectable “private sphere” is deeply
rooted in the original physical manifestation of privacy protections—
the family home.102 The American home represents a clear, legally
protected place103 where a person can expect that their affairs,
activities, words and thoughts are free from government intrusion.104
The American home became the epicenter for a legally protected
private zone in large part because of its perceived importance to
establish familial bonds—“the home derives its pre-eminence as the
seat of family life.”105 Marital relations and family life are considered

96. Solove, supra note 2, at 556.
97. Id. at 557–58 (noting that the Supreme Court first articulated the “[v]arious
guarantees [by the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy” in Griswold v. Connecticut).
98. See id. at 553.
99. Id. at 556. “As Robert Post observes, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion upholds
rules of civility and social respect. We each have certain ‘territories of the self,’ and norms
of civility require that we respect others’ territories.”
100. It is troubling that the legal standard to evaluate the degree and setting of the
intrusion are couched in terms of male sexual dominance like “penetrate.”
101. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 299.
102. See Solove, suprai note 2, at 552 (emphasizing the elevated legal significance of the
home “[f]or hundreds of years, the law has strongly guarded the privacy of the home”).
103. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(finding that “the right ‘to marry, establish a home and bring up children’ was an essential
part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
104. See id. at 484 (reiterating that “[t]he Fourth and Fifth Amendments [act] as
protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life’”).
105. Id. at 495 (noting that “[t]he home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family
life”).
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the most private and intimate of associations.106 Courts recognized the
“private realm of family life” as a natural zone to protect because of the
belief that valuable social bonds are forged in the home.107 The home
became a place of social retreat and solitude “enabl[ing] people to rest
from the pressures of living in public and performing public roles.”108
Three pivotal Supreme Court cases109 illustrate the development of
privacy law in terms of distinct spheres and explore the judicial
reliance on the presumed sanctity of the home to anchor new privacy
protections.110
First, in Griswold v. Connecticut the Supreme Court struck down
a Connecticut law banning the use of contraceptives on the grounds
that the law intruded upon a Constitutionally protected “zone of
privacy.”111 The concurrence in Griswold found a right to sexual
privacy by relying on an earlier Fourteenth Amendment case and reestablished that the “right ‘to marry, establish a home and bring up
children’ was an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”112 The Court expounded on the weight of the
marital home as a “particularly important and sensitive area of privacy”
and found the mere idea of the government searching the “sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms” as “repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.”113
Second, in Katz v. United States the Court held that “wiretapping
and eavesdropping by law enforcement agents was a constitutional
search that would need to satisfy [] Fourth Amendment
prerequisites.”114 Katz extended Fourth Amendment protections to
telephone conversations, finding that the protection “cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.”115
Most noteworthy, Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz articulated

106. Id.
107. Solove, supra note 2, at 555 (elaborating that “a space apart from others has
enabled people to develop artistic, political, and religious ideas that have had lasting
influence and value when later introduced into the public sphere”).
108. Id.
109. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967);
and Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001).
110. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361(Harlan, J., concurring). “[A] man’s home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy.”
111. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
112. Id. at 495 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923)).
113. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
114. Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act,
56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 24 (2004) (summarizing Katz).
115. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
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a two-part requirement116 to determine the reasonableness of a privacy
expectation: “[1] that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, [2] that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”117 Katz “represents a great
touchstone in the law of privacy” because Justice Harlan’s test
“extend[ed] beyond the confines of the Constitution [and] found its
way into common law and statutes” expounding privacy protections.118
The additional requirement that a privacy invasion must be subjectively
and objectively reasonable has significantly shaped the development
and focus of privacy rights.119
Katz also represents a failed attempt to expand the right of privacy
beyond the notion of the static home.120 The Court famously declared
that the right to privacy should be attached to a person—“[f]or the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”121 Yet, ultimately the
Court declined to expand privacy into a “general constitutional ‘right to
privacy,’” preferring to leave these protections “largely to the law of
the individual States.”122
Third, in Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that thermovision
imaging of a private home constituted an unlawful search under the
Fourth Amendment.123 Again the Court reiterated the importance of
the home as an anchor to privacy rights—“in the sanctity of the home,
all details are intimate details.”124 The Court also reiterated its
subjective-objective standard from Katz that a privacy intrusion occurs
“when the [intruder] violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable.”125
Ultimately, these three Supreme Court cases illustrate how the
development of privacy rights in the United States are intrinsically
linked and entangled with the concept of a “private sphere.”126
116. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. Justice Scalia directly addressed critics in his opinion noting
that the two-part requirement “has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and
unpredictable.”
117. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
118. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test,
40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009)..
119. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (establishing reasonableness of a
privacy interest as precedent by adopting Justice Harlan’s two prong test in the majority
opinion).
120. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (noting that “effort[s] to decide whether or not a given ‘area,’
viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects attention from the problem
presented by this case”).
121. Id.
122. Id at 350–51.
123. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
124. Id. at 28.
125. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
126. Id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
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ii. The “Private Sphere” Collides with Workplace Realities
The theoretical concept of a discernable private zone remains
central to the legal analysis of a workplace privacy invasion claim.
The Supreme Court explains that the “essential” first step of such an
inquiry is to “delineate the boundaries of the workplace context.”127
This first step perpetuates a fallacy that the American employment
relationship can be carved into a clearly designated and separate “work
space.”128 The Court describes workplace boundaries as “those areas
and items that are related to work and are generally within the
employer’s control.”129 The legal standard operates in terms of
discernable spatial boundaries, even when modern and historical
examples of work organization show the weakness of the standard’s
conceptual underpinnings.
For example, Industrial Era work structures such as company
towns and “Fordism”130 practices highlight how even more traditional
workplace boundaries bled into the private sphere. Employers that
operated company towns exerted influence in both the professional and
personal zones of its employees. For instance, in the coal mining and
steel industry “employers [would] pay workers in scrip redeemable
only at the company store, located in the company town where
employees lived and worked.”131 The legal approach to discern
workplace boundaries as a prerequisite to privacy is inadequate to
protect employees in these types of complicated employment
relationships. The work structure of a company town undercuts even
the quintessential private sphere, the home, because all areas of the
company town are in some sense related to the work and remained
within the employer’s control.
The Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) serves as another early
example of an employment relationship that intentionally blended the
“private” and “work” spheres.132 Ford implemented a policy to pay its
127. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987).
128. Id. at 715–16 (explaining workplace boundaries in a physical example “[a]t a
hospital, for example, the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among other
areas, are all part of the workplace”).
129. Id. at 715.
130. Defined by the Merriam Webster Dictionary as “a technological system that
seeks to increase production efficiency primarily through carefully engineered
breakdown and interlocking of production operations and that depends for its
success on mass production by assembly-line methods.” ‘Fordism’ Definition,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Fordism. The actual employment
practices and policies of Henry Ford have also been referred to as “corporate
paternalism.” See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not A Hobby: The Judicial Revival of
Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 78 (2015).
131. Strine, supra note 141, at 78.
132. Angerer, supra note 1, at 36.; Strine, supra note 141, at 78 (elaborating that

2017]

#PRIVATESPHERE

307

employees twice the average wage on the condition that they
“conformed to Henry Ford’s religious and moral ideals.”133 The
structure of the employment agreement meant that even in the sanctity
of their own home, a Ford employee could not fully enjoy a true zone
of familial privacy because company investigators would “visit
worker’s houses, conduct interviews, and perform inspections” to
guarantee that employees “liv[ed] their lives according to middle class,
Protestant values.”134 These types of invasive practices blur workplace
boundaries and in turn diminish privacy rights because employers can
“not only control[] employee behavior during the work days [] but also
attempt[] to control what their workers did with their scarce free
time.”135
Even though the example of the Ford Motor Company’s corporate
paternalism136 seems extreme, it highlights the potential flaws in
hinging worker privacy rights on a fictional “private sphere” that is
separate and distinct from work. As the modern employer practice of
extensive employee monitoring through technology137 is “becoming
ubiquitous,”138 the legal fiction of a private zone of retreat is again at
odds with protecting employee privacy.
Today, on the whole, it is difficult for employees to gain
meaningful privacy protections under the general legal standards.139
These standards reflect judicial adherence to a legal fiction that cannot
adequately account for the blurred lines between “zones.” As a
practical matter, in employment privacy “for the most part, private
employers must intrude into very private places — such as restrooms
or locker rooms — to face liability for [a privacy claim].”140
Typical workplace privacy issues arise from employer actions,
such as physical and psychological testing, investigatory interrogations
and searches of persons/spaces, monitoring and surveillance, inquiries
“Corporate paternalism was not an incidental aspect of the scheme: paying workers in scrip,
and controlling where they could live, enabled employers to police all aspects of their
workers’ lives”).
133. Id. at 81.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 73.
136. Id. (arguing that transition to industrial capitalism in American bred “a new strain
of feudalism returned in the form of something that might charitably be called ‘corporate
paternalism’”).
137. Id. at 75. “Employers are limiting the privacy of workers through technology—
such as workplace phone and computer monitoring, cameras, or drug and nicotine testing—
for bottom line, business reasons.”
138. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 357.
139. Angerer, supra note 1, at 4. “Moreover, employment law has, unfortunately,
proven to be woefully inadequate in promoting and protecting employee privacy at the
workplace.”
140. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 301.
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into prohibitions of off-site conduct and revelations into private
matters.141 Employers offer various legitimate business concerns to
justify perceived privacy invasions, including maintaining the public
image of the business, ensuring productivity, effectively evaluating
work performance, and thwarting potential employee misconduct.142
B. Why Employee Privacy Protections Fail at the Threshold Issue: Did
the Employee Have a Reasonable Expectation or Privacy?
The threshold issue an employee must establish to proceed with an
invasion of privacy claim is whether or not she had an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy. This initial element “offer[s] little
help to employees because of the decreased expectation of privacy
inherent in any workplace.”143
Whether or not an employee’s expectation of privacy in her work
setting is reasonable is addressed on a “case-by-case basis”144 and
considers the “customs, practices, and physical settings [] as well as the
opportunity to be notified in advance and consent to the intrusion.”145
Employers can easily defeat the threshold element of reasonable
expectation to privacy through proper planning with prior notice,
written consent and practices and procedures.146 Therefore, the legal
standard a plaintiff must meet in a privacy claim is particularly
“difficult []to meet in the workplace context,”147 in part because regular
employee monitoring is a widely accepted practice and also because
jurisprudence tends to favor employer’s interests more heavily in a
balancing test for privacy.148
1. Notice as a Restriction on “Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy”
Notice serves as a protective mechanism to decimate or restrict
employee privacy claims because it effectively limits the
“reasonableness” of the employee’s expectation of privacy before an
issue even arises.149 The following cases involve nearly identical facts
but illustrate the problematic jurisprudence that develops when privacy
141. Id.
142. Mgrditchian, supra note 18, at 133; S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the
Public/private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825,
836–38 (1998).
143. See Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 357–58.
144. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 317 (2010).
145. Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 297–98.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 299.
148. See id. at 290, 357–58.
149. Id.
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protections are determined state by state.
Two cases involving attorney-client email communications sent
using employer issued computers demonstrate the power of notice as a
proactive tactic to limit the likelihood of an employee prevailing on a
privacy claim.150 These examples show how even the “oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law”
rooted in a fundamental public policy to promote justice151 can fall
under the reasonable expectation of privacy requirement.
First, in Holmes v. Petrovich the court held that an employee did
not have a reasonable expectation to privacy in her email
communications with her lawyer because she sent the email from a
company issued computer and the employer had a computer usage
policy that warned the employee that electronic communications were
subject to company monitoring.152 Even though the employee
“believed her personal e-mail would be private because she utilized a
private password [] and she deleted the e-mails after they were sent,”
the Holmes court analogized the use of a company issued device to
communicate with an attorney as “akin to consulting her attorney in
one of defendants’ conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the door
open, yet unreasonably expecting that the conversation overheard by
[employer] would be privileged.”153 In Holmes, the prior notice from
the computer usage policy effectively destroyed the employee’s ability
to meet the threshold consideration of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.154
On the other hand, in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., the
court held that the employee did have an expectation of privacy in her
email communications with her lawyer.155 Here the employee also
used a work-issued computer to send the communication, but she
prevailed because she took “steps to protect the privacy of those emails and shield them from her employer” and the computer usage
150. Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1068 (2011)
151. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that “the
purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice”).
152. See Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1068 (2011)
(explaining the legal test as: “when (1) the electronic means used belongs to the defendant;
(2) the defendant has advised the plaintiff that communications using electronic means are
not private, may be monitored, and may be used only for business purposes; and (3) the
plaintiff is aware of and agrees to these conditions”).
153. Holmes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 1068–69. .
154. Id. at 1071 (noting that “employer policies concerning communications will of
course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that
such policies are clearly communicated”).
155. See generally Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 201 N.J. 300, 321–22 (2010).
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agreement was vague.156 Despite the employee favorable ruling, the
Stengart court was careful to limit their holding to prevent an
expansion of privacy rights to employees, noting that their legal
conclusion “does not mean that employers cannot monitor or regulate
the use of workplace computers.”157 While the legal outcome for the
plaintiff in Stengart was favorable, the court still made sure to note the
power of effective prior notice to shape a reasonable expectation of
privacy at work.
2. The Power of Consent as a Restriction
Even if an employee can show that their privacy interest is
objectively reasonable, their attempt to gain a legal remedy can still fail
with proof that they agreed to the possibility of the invasion.158
For example, in Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Superior Court
the court reiterated the power of consent to trump invasions—
“[c]onsent remains a viable defense even in cases of serious privacy
invasions.”159 Here, the employer required a health care worker to
demonstrate a cervical self-exam by inserting a speculum into her
vagina in front of coworkers and female clients.160 Even though the
court determined that the cervical self-exam “infringe[d] a legally
protected privacy interest,” the plaintiff signed a consent form to the
policy in her new hire documents so her otherwise strong claim to
privacy invasion was defeated as a matter of law.161
In conclusion, even when a plaintiff employee can successfully
meet the threshold requirement that their expectation of privacy be
“reasonable”, these claims often fail because employers notified the
employee of the invasion prior to the incident or obtained signed
consent to the invasion.162
IV. PROPOSAL
I propose a two-part approach to address the failures of privacy
rights in the employment relationship. First I suggest private ordering
as an interim solution to address the significant power and
informational imbalances between employees and employers. This
interim solution aims to educate workers, curb employer monitoring

156.
157.
158.
(1997).
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 324–25.
Feminist Women’s Health Ctr. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1234, 1249
Id.
See id at 1237.
Id. at 1247–49.
See Ciocchetti, supra note 4, at 297–98.
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practices, and ultimately allow employees to become meaningful
participants in the labor market and political process to advocate for
their own privacy rights. Secondly, to truly address the inherent
pitfalls of the legal standards of privacy protections in the employment
context I recommend a return to the Katz approach of conceptualizing
privacy as a fluid concept attached to a person, and overhauling the
“reasonable” requirement to properly calibrate privacy rights to
freedom of informational control as opposed to acceptable social
outrage.
First, this private ordering solution borrows from successful
privacy standards developed by the international community163 to
create a flexible structure that can lead to a conceptual overhaul of
privacy law and elevate the bargaining power of employees.164 I
recommend employers that choose to engage in employee monitoring
incorporate the two key consumer choice principles of Collection
Limitation and Purpose Specification into their corporate practices.165
The Collection Limitation Principle would allow an employee to
restrict the data collected about herself by her employer in an “opt-in”
choice.166 Whereas the Purpose Specification Principle would restrict
the employer from using the data on an employee in any way not
previously disclosed.167 Incorporating these principles will ensure that
organizations limit the collection of potentially sensitive private data
about their employees and only use collected data for a disclosed
purpose.
Additionally, using these consumer choice principles in the
employment context would also help to rectify the power and
informational imbalance between an employee and their employer.
Although employers have used notice and consent principles mainly as
a weapon against employee claims to privacy, these consumer choice
163. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderfl
owsofpersonaldata.htm#guidelines.
164. See William J. Kambas, A Safety Net in the E-Marketplace: The Safe Harbor
Principles Offer Comprehensive Privacy Protection Without Stopping Data Flow, 9 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 149, 157-58 (2002) (explaining that the OECFP guidelines “represent a
consensus on basic principles which can be built into existing national legislation, or serve
as a basis for legislation in those countries which do not yet have it”).
165. Id. at 153, 158 (explaining that the “OECD Guidelines provide guidance to
legislative efforts and the development of private sector privacy policies” and explaining
each of the eight principles in depth).
166. See id. at 158 (explaining that the Collection Limitation Principle “allows data
subjects to choose whether or not they want data collected and collection is restricted to
consumer preferences”).
167. Id. at 159 (explaining further that “the Purpose Specification Principle further limits
permitted uses to those purposes explicitly stated by the data collector”).
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driven principles should force nefarious monitoring practices into the
public debate for scrutiny as employees become more involved in the
decisions about what data is collected and how it is used. This interim
step aims to bring both employer and employee expectations of privacy
issues and actual practices into alignment.
Finally, the ultimate goal of the quasi-self-regulatory scheme is to
improve employer understanding of the potential legal liability inherent
in excessive data gathering and educate employees about the reality of
their limited privacy protections at work. The private ordering gap
filler proposal accounts for the time necessary for technologies to
mature before implementing the wide sweeping legislative change
necessary to dethrone the “private sphere” distinction and rebuild legal
privacy protections for workers.
The new regime of privacy
protections in the employment context should abandon the objectively
reasonable requirement that wrongfully elevates generally acceptable
outrage over true privacy and freedom of informational control.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, modern employment trends exacerbate the
inadequacies of the legal standards that could provide privacy
protections to workers. Technological advancements increase the
amount of sensitive data employers capture from their employees and
foster 24/7 work schedules where the legal fiction of a private sphere
collapses with the blended realities of twenty-first century work.
Under the current regime of privacy doctrine in the employment
context, employers are able to defeat most claims of privacy invasions
through careful planning and adherence to industry standards. To
remedy the substantial power and informational imbalances between
employees and employers an interim quasi-self-regulatory system has
the flexibility to address immediate concerns and adapt appropriately to
rapidly changing technology. Most importantly, the interim system
forces employees into active roles in the negotiation for privacy in the
workplace thereby empowering a new group of potential advocates.
Advocating with experience in the complex modern employment
relationship may support legislative efforts that can do away with static
notions of physical zones and return to privacy rooted in the person,
and focused on the freedom, of informational privacy.

